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ILLINOIS' STATE SUBSIDY
OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
AT PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS ACT
On August 25, 1978, the 80th General Assembly passed legislation provid-
ing full tuition payments to handicapped students attending private educa-
tional facilities as long as the student's school district certifies that such an
arrangement is in compliance with the rules and regulations of the State
Superintendent of Education. The effect of the State Subsidy of Special
Education at Private Institutions Act, P.A. 80-1405,1 is to ensure the right of
a free education to handicapped students even though the child's school dis-
trict is unable to provide the necessary services.
Illinois courts have traditionally been reluctant to recognize an absolute
right to a state supported education. 2 Similarly, limitations imposed by the
legislature have restricted the educational services available to handicapped
students of the state. 3  In light of these considerations, P.A. 80-1405 repre-
sents a significant breakthrough in recognition of the educational' rights of
handicapped children.
This new legislation was passed in order to bring Illinois into compliance
with an equally significant federal law, the Education for All Handicapped
Children's Act (EAHCA). 4  Pursuant to EAHCA, Congress has allowed the
allocation of federal funds to state and local governments for support of their
special educational programs only if the state ensures full payment of tuition
costs to all students. 5
1. Act of August 25, 1978, Pub. Act No. 80-1405, 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 984 (West).
2. See, e.g., Department of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 15 Ill. 2d 204, 154 N.E.2d 265 (1958).
In the first Illinois Supreme Court case concerning schooling for the handicapped, it was held
that under the 1870 Constitution, the legislature was free to determine the public school cur-
riculum and was not required to provide instruction for handicapped students incapable of ben-
efiting from the common school courses. Id. at 213, 154 N.E.2d at 270. As a result, the court
found the father of a feeble-minded child liable for the child's maintenance costs in residing at a
state hospital hnd rejected the father's claims that the hospital was a school which had to be free
under Article VIII of the 1870 Constitution. Id. at 212, 154 N.E.2d at 270.
Similarly, in Pierce v. Board of Educ., 69 Ill. 2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977), the court
restrictively interpreted the scope of Article X, § 1, of the 1970 Constitution. The court held
that the education article merely stated a general philosophy to provide for the educational
development of all persons to the limits of their capacities rather than proposing a mandate that
special education be provided for those who require it. Id. at 92-93, 370 N.E.2d at 536. As
such, the court rejected the claims of a learning disability student that the school district had a
duty to place him in a special educational program merely upon his showing of such a need.
3. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02, the section of the School Code amended by
P.A. 80-1405, placed a ceiling on tuition reimbursement to the school district for private educa-
tional services which were offered as a supplement to available public programs. It thereby
shifted any additional costs not paid by the state to the parents of the enrolled child.
For a more detailed analysis of the practical limitations encountered in securing the available
special educational programs furnished by the School Code, see Keenan, Current Issues in
Illinois School Law: The Consumer's Perspective, 23 DEPAUL L. REv. 402, 448-57 (1973).
4. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
5. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(16), 1401(18), 1411, 1412, 1413(a)(4) (1976).
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Both the Illinois and federal statutory provisions satisfy most educational
rights claims of the handicapped. But if federal funds for the state's special
educational programs are not appropriated,6 the issues of the Illinois and
federal constitutional right to education for all persons "to the limits of their
capacities" must be addressed to ensure equal educational opportunities for
the handicapped.
It is the purpose of this Note to explore the state constitutional and statu-
tory history of educational rights for the handicapped in order to determine
the scope of the entitlement afforded by P.A. 80-1405. Additionally, the
state constitutional right to education and the federal equal protection claims
to a publicly supported educational program will be examined to determine
what rights a handicapped student can assert beyond those given by these
statutes if funds provided by these statutes are discontinued.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Education, as a right or a privilege, is not specifically mentioned in the
United States Constitution. By implication the framers viewed public educa-
tion as a matter better left to the individual states. 7 As a result, all states
formulated an education article of some sort in their state constitutions 8 and
relegated to their legislatures the particular scope and construction of the
educational systems to be provided for the public. 9
6. This very issue of limited available federal funds to the states was considered by the
Senate which debated the Act before its approval. See 121 CONG. REc. 25,533-38 (1975). Senator
Ashbrook, in response to a proposed amendment to the Act regarding entitlements and alloca-
tions, stated "it is totally unrealistic to hold out to the education community that we can spend
from $2 to $4 billion yearly on this program. One of the objects [sic] I have always had to many
Federal aid programs is that false hopes are held out and appropriations do not match the
authorizations." id. at 25,535. Similarly, Senator McKay expressed his concern that "[uit is com-
pletely unrealistic to assume that this Congress will appropriate money at the authorized
levels." Id. at 25,537.
7. This conclusion is supported by the terms of U.S. CONST. amend. X, which provides:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
8. The constitutions of all fifty states provide for either the establishment or encourage-
ment of public education programs. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment:
The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAw. 855, 870 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Burgdorfl. Many state
constitutions specifically provide that public education shall be equally available to all. Others
generally declare that their educational systems shall be thorough and efficient. Id. at 868.
9. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. oF 1970 art. X, § 1 (emphasis added):
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all
persons to the limits of their capacities. The State shall provide for an efficient
system of high quality public education institutions and services. Education in pub-
lic schools through the secondary level shall be free. There may be such free educa-
tion as the General Assembly provides by law.
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public educa-
tion.
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The Educational Entitlement for the Handicapped
Under the 1870 Constitution: Statutory
and Case Law Interpretation
The 1870 Illinois Constitution specifically guaranteed the right to a free
"common school education" for the children of Illinois.1° This education
article was interpreted by the courts as a command to the legislature to
establish and maintain a "good" common school educational system, with the
only limitation that it could not deny this system to the public nor require
any Illinois resident to pay for this system except through taxation.1 1
Moreover, the courts deferred to the legislature's discretion in defining what
constituted a "good" common school education and interpreting the scope of
the 'educational system that was to be provided. 12
See also the California Education Article which provides: "A general diffusion of Knowledge and
intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the
Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, moral and ag-
ricultural improvement."
CAL. CONST. OF 1849 art. 9, § 1 (emphasis added).
10. ILL. CONST. OF 1870 art. VIII, § 1, provides: "The General Assembly shall provide a
thorough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of this state may receive a
good common school education."
11. This interpretation was elucidated by the courts in several cases in which the issues
presented were resolved by such a meaning given the education article. See Hamer v. Board of
Educ., 47 11l. 2d 480, 488, 265 N.E.2d 616, 620 (1971) (upholding text-books fees); People v.
Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 30, 81 N.E.2d 581, 586 (1948) (sustaining a community unit school
district act); People v. Young, 309 11. 27, 33, 139 N.E. 894, 896 (1923) (holding that a school
district cannot be organized to prevent convenient travel to its students).
12. See McClain v. Phelps, 409 I1. 393, 398, 100 N.E.2d 753, 756 (1951), where the court
sustained issuance of bonds by the board of education. The court stated that it has "repeatedly
held that the question of efficiency and fairness of the school system, established by legislative
action, is solely one for the legislature." See also People v. Deatherage, 401 I11. 25, 31, 81
N.E.2d 581, 586 (1948) (constitutional challenge of a community school district act: "[T]he ques-
tion of the efficiency and thoroughness of the school system established by legislative permission
is one solely for the legislature to answer and the courts lack power to intrude."); Fiedler v.
Eckfeldt, 335 II1. 11, 23, 166 N.E. 504, 509 (1929) (restraint of high school bond issue sought by
residents of a school district: "The responsibility and duty of providing the system and the
means and agencies by which it should be made effective rest upon the General Assembly
alone. It is [not] within the authority of the court to pass upon the thoroughness and efficiency
of the system."); People v. Graham, 301 III. 446, 452, 134 N.E. 57, 60 (1922) (appeal of a
dismissal of an information in the nature of quo warranto filed against members of a local school
board: "It is not for the courts to say that the legislature has acted unwisely in selecting the
agencies or methods which it deems best to carry out the mandate of the constitution, and the
courts cannot interfere unless the legislature . . . as a matter of fact, created a system of free
schools which all reasonable men must agree is not an efficient and thorough system.")
This same interpretation was adopted in reference to the 1970 Constitution by the Illinois
Appellate Court. See Board of Educ. School Dist. No. 150 v. Cronin, 51 111. App. 3d 838, 840
367 N.E.2d 501, 503 (3d Dist. 1977) (denial of a declaratory judgment action initiated to find
that the state owed a duty to local boards of education to fully subsidize special educational
services: "the question of the efficiency and fairness of the school system, established by legisla-
tive action, is solely one for the legislature to answer.")
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Because the constitution merely provided that a public educational system
was to be established for the children of the state, the legislature was under
the duty to enact the laws and specify the nature of the entitlement. Pur-
suant to this mandate, the legislature enacted the School Code.'" It is the
Code, together with the Rules and Regulations of the Illinois Office of Edu-
cation promulgated under the Code's authorization, 1 4 that provides the basis
for, and defines the scope of the educational system in Illinois.
An examination of the statutory development of the Illinois school system
under the various enactments of the School Code reveals that students with
mental or physical handicaps were effectively excluded. 15 Only through ad-
vancements in educational techniques and greater public awareness did the
legislature begin to provide effective public programs for these children.' 6
The first significant legislative action relating to special education made pub-
lic services available to orthopedically handicapped children and those with
sight or hearing defects.1 7 It was not until 1942 that comprehensive legisla-
tion was enacted to assist school districts in providing special educational
services for "all children in need." "' These provisions, however, were
merely optional and did not require school districts to include special classes
for handicapped children.
Since special education programs were not mandatory under the School
Code, handicapped children turned to the courts in an effort to obtain access
to the public school system under the education article of the constitution.
The Illinois Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of the right to schooling
for the handicapped in Department of Public Welfare v. Haas.19 In this
case, the father of a mentally handicapped boy residing at a state hospital
was sued for payment of the child's maintenance under a statute imposing
liability on parents to meet such charges. 2 0  As a defense to this action, the
father claimed that the Education Article of the 1870 Constitution required
the state to provide a free common school education to all children, includ-
ing mentally deficient children such as his son. 21 He therefore argued that
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, 9 1-1214 (1977).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 114 (1977).
15. There is no mention of special education for any type of handicapped children in the
first School Code promulgated by the Illinois legislature, the Free School Act of 1825, 1825 Ill.
Laws at 121, nor in the next major educational enactment, the Common School Act of 1845,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 98, §§ 1-90 (1845). The first act passed relating to any type of special
educational provisions authorized school districts to establish and maintain classes for the deaf in
the public schools. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 391 (1897).
16. For a concise historical perspective of the development of the special education laws in
Illinois, see ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, ILL. SCHOOL LAW
(1977). For a general discussion of the history of special education, see Burgdorf, supra note 8,
at 870-76.
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 520-530 (1929); id. §§ 547(1)-(9) (1924).
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 675-685 (1942).
19. 15 III. 2d 204, 154 N.E.2d 265 (1958).
20. Id. at 207, 154 N.E.2d at 267.
21. Id. at 213, 154 N.E.2d at 270.
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the state should assume his son's institutional maintenance costs as a part of
its constitutional responsibility to provide an education to all children of the
state. The court rejected this interpretation of the education article and held
that the constitutional guarantee of free education only applied to children
with the capacity to receive an education in the school system as established
by the legislature."2 Since existing legislation did not require the state to
provide a free educational program for mentally deficient children as part of
its common school system, the court held that the constitutional educational
entitlement did not apply in this situation.2 3
According to Haas, then, the right to a free education as granted by the
1870 Constitution did not apply to handicapped children who were not eligi-
ble for the established school programs. Also, the court held that the legisla-
ture was free to determine the content of the curriculum to be taught by the
public schools. Thus, the court found no conflict with the constitutional
mandate to establish a free common school system when the legislature
excluded the instruction of special and handicapped students from the school
program. 24
Educational Rights of the Handicapped Under the Revised School
Code and the 1970 Constitution
The court's refusal in Haas to recognize the right of handicapped children
to a public education effectively foreclosed a judicial remedy 25 and thus
forced handicapped advocates to address the legislature for a statutory exten-
sion of the educational entitlement. Due in part to these lobbying efforts, a
significant special educational entitlement was authorized by the General As-
sembly in 1965.26 The Act to Revise the School Code Provisions for the
Handicapped provides that all school districts shall establish special educa-




25. Indeed, the issue of the scope of the educational entitlement as applied to handicapped
children did not come before the courts until Elliot v. Board of Educ., 64 Ill. App. 3d 229, 380
N.E.2d 1137 (1st Dist. 1978), was first filed. The plaintiffs in Elliot, unlike those in prior educa-
tion cases, based their court challenge on the educational article of the new constitution. They
also advanced the argument that the entitlement given the handicapped by the legislature vio-
lated the equal protection clause because some of the special educational programs were not
tuition-free as were the programs established for other students. See notes 43-45 and accom-
panying text infra for the results of Elliot on appeal.
26. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 14-1.01 to 14-14.01 (1965).
27. Id. § 14-4.01 (1977). In pertinent part it provides: "School boards of any school districts
... may until July 1, 1969, and shall thereafter, . . . establish and maintain such special educa-
tional facilities as may be needed for one or more of the types of handicapped children . . . who
are residents of their school district."
Pursuant to this statute, id. § 14-6.01, rules and regulations were also promulgated by the
Superintendent of Public Instruction to define the responsibility for special education, provide
for its establishment and administration, outline the nature of special education instructional
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:769
been interpreted by the court to "impose a mandatory duty on [local school
districts] to establish and maintain needed special education facilities." 2 8
This provision provides a substantial improvement over the "optional" re-
quirements of previous statutory interpretations in that the children who
qualify as handicapped under the School Code 29 have a recognized statutory
right to a publicly supported education.
Concurrent with the development of a statutory right to education for the
handicapped was a constitutional development through the enactment of a
revised education article in the 1970 Constitution . 30 The new article reaf-
firmed the state's commitment to financially support the public educational
system through the secondary level. But the most significant revision was
the article's particularized statement of the state's goal to educationally de-
velop "all persons to the limits of their capacities." 31
From a review of the constitutional history, it appears that the framers
intended the educational entitlement of the 1970 Constitution to be broader
than the 1870 goal of a good common school education. 32  Specifically, the
Constitutional Committee on Education, in formulating the new article, was
concerned with the limitation on the right to an education that was imposed
in Haas.33 By replacing the article's goal of a "good common school educa-
tion" with the goal of the educational development of all persons, the fram-
ers were emphasizing that the educational system should be expanded
programs and supportive services, provide general procedures for the identification and evalua-
tion of exceptional children and review of educational placement. See STATE OF ILLINOIS, OF-
FICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, RULES AND REGULATIONS TO GOV-
ERN ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF SPECIAL EDUCATION [hereinafter cited as SPEC. ED.
RULES].
28. Nickerson v. Thompson, 504 F.2d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 1974).
29. For a discussion of the various categories of handicapped children who are eligible for
the state-provided services, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-1.02 to 1.07 (1977). The defined
categories include children with physical, mental, social, emotional, or learning disabilities of
such character that they are unable to learn in a "normal" classroom setting and so require
special services to achieve any educational development.
30. ILL. CONST. OF 1970 art. X, § 1. See note 9 supra.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. The intent that the new education article provide a more broad entitlement than the
1870 provision was clearly stated by the framers: "The existing constitutional provision is not
adequate to express the importance now given to the educational enterprise. . . . [The proposal]
is designed to set forth the State's goal for the educational development of all persons. It consti-
tutes a broad statement of purpose and emphasizes the importance of education." 6 CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, COMMITTEE PROPOSALS 233 (Dec. 8, 1969-Sept. 3, 1970).
33. Malcolm S. Kamin, a Delegate to the Committee on Education, in a statement to the
full Constitutional Convention, said that one of the objectives of the proposed amendment was
to extend the educational opportunities for the normal and handicapped beyond the notion of
the common schools. He cited the Haas case as a limitation on the constitutional educational
entitlement that the Committee intended to expand with the drafting of the new article. 6
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS 797-98 (Dec. 8,
1969-Sept. 3, 1970).
The authors of a commentary to the 1970 Constitution similiarly expressed the interpretation
that the stated fundamental goal of the development of all persons to the limits of their
capabilities superseded Haas. Helman and Whalen, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY, S.H.A.
CONSTITUTION art. X, § 1.
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beyond traditional notions of an educational program. 3 4  Thus, from the
framers' perspective, the 1970 education article guarantees the right of the
handicapped to a state-supported education even in the absence of statutory
authorization of special education programs.
Although the capacity to receive a "good" common school education no
longer appears to be a qualification for one's right to an education under the
1970 Constitution, 35 the Illinois Supreme Court remains reluctant to expand
this right beyond that authorized by the legislature. 36 In short, the court
seems to be relying more on the established limitations set by the repealed
constitution than on the intentions of the framers of the existing constitu-
tion.3 7
Despite this apparent reluctance, a recent Illinois Appellate Court deci-
sion reflects a judicial interpretation of the education article more consistent
34. The Committee explained its proposed draft of the education article in terms of the
objectives by stating:
[T]he objective that all persons be educated to the limits of their capacities would
require expansion beyond the traditional public school programs. It recognizes the
need of the person with a physical handicap or mental deficiency who nevertheless
is educable. . . .The objective is to provide each person an opportunity to progress
to the limit of his ability.
6 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, COMMITTEE PROPOSALS 234 (Dec. 8, 1969-
Sept. 3, 1970).
This stated objective is obviously broader than the 1870 constitutional objective that "all
children of this state may receive a good common school education." A common school educa-
tion, although not defined by the constitution but left to the determination of the legislature,
was generally regarded as the "rudimental elements" of education. Powell v. Board of Educ., 97
I1. 375, 378 (1881). The court in Richards v. Raymond, 92 I1. 612 (1879), suggested that a
common school education might consist of instructions in reading, writing, geography, English
grammar, and arithmetic. Id. at 617. Therefore, the inclusion of specialized programs for hand-
icaps as anticipated by the new constitutional article seems to extend beyond this common
school concept.
35. The capacity to receive a traditional common school education was the primary restric-
tion relied on by the court in Haas when it denied state funds for the education and inainte-
nance of a mentally deficient child. See notes 19-24 and accompanying text supra.
36. See Pierce v. Board of Educ., 69 Ill. 2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977). This is the only case
decided by the Illinois Supreme Court to date which interpreted section 1 of the Education
Article of the 1970 Constitution. The court held that section 1 is merely a statement of general
philosophy and does not impose a constitutional duty to establish special educational programs.
Id. at 92-93, 370 N.E.2d at 536.
Other cases requiring the courts' interpretations of the new education article similarly reflect
restrictive interpretations of the article despite the framers' intention to expand the constitu-
tional entitlement. See Blase v. State, 55 I1. 2d 94, 302 N.E.2d 46 (1972) (holding that para-
graph 3 of the education article was a mere policy statement of the state's financial responsibility
for education rather than a command to the state to assume 50 per cent of school expenditures).
See also Hamer v. Board of Educ., 9 Ill. App. 3d 663, 292 N.E.2d 569 (2d Dist. 1973) (holding
that the precepts for interpreting the scope of "free education" under the 1870 Constitution
applied to interpretations of the 1970 Constitution).
37. See, e.g., Pierce v. Board of Educ., 69 II. 2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977); Hamer v.
Board of Educ., 9 Il. App. 3d 663, 292 N.E.2d 569 (2d Dist. 1973).
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with the intent of the new constitution. In Elliot v. Board of Education,38 a
class action suit was brought on behalf of all handicapped students attending
approved private facilities whose local school districts were unable to provide
the necessary educational services appropriate to meet their particular
needs. The plaintiffs challenged a provision of the School Code 39 which lim-
ited to $2500 the amount of tuition that the state, through its school dis-
tricts, must pay for the special education of those students who have been
excluded from the public schools.4 0
In particular, the plaintiffs contended that the state, by limiting the
amount of tuition reimbursable to the local district, forced their families to
pay for the education of their handicapped child to the same extent other
children are educated through regular public instruction. Thus, they argued
that the statute violated the 1970 Constitutional provision requiring free
education in public schools through the secondary level. 41 The students
also argued that the provision violated the equal protection clauses of both
the United States and Illinois Constitutions because unlike normal students
or handicapped students who are able to attend the public schools, they are
forced to pay a portion of their education costs.
42
The court agreed that the statutory provision violated the constitutional
mandate to provide a free education to all persons. It based its decision on
an interpretation of the existing constitution and specifically rejected the in-
terpretation of the 1870 Constitution as controlling.4 3 The court held that
38. 64 Ill. App. 3d 229, 380 N.E.2d 1137 (lst Dist. 1978).
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1975).
40. This section of the School Code authorized school districts-in certain situations where
the local public schools lack the necessary resources to educate certain handicapped children-
to enter into a contract with non-public institutions to provide the facilities for which the state is
responsible. When a child attends such a private school, the district is responsible for the
tuition charged by the private institution or $2500, whichever is less. To be eligible for this
program, the child must be enrolled in the public schools. The local district has the responsibil-
ity for placement in an approved private program as well as continuing responsibility for his
education under this alternative system. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1975).
41. Elliot v. Board of Educ., 64 I11. App. 3d 229, 234, 380 N.E.2d 1137, 1141 (1st Dist.
1978).
42. See Brief for Plaintiff at 49-50, Elliot v. Board of Educ., 64 I11. App. 3d 229, 380 N.E.2d
1137 (1st Dist. 1978). The court did not reach this issue but based its decision solely on the
ground that the statute violated article X of the Illinois Constitution. 1d. at 234, 380 N.E.2d at
1141.
43. In the words of the court:
Were we constrained to review the present controversy by reference to the Con-
stitution of 1870, this argument [defendant's argument that the legislature was free
to determine the meaning of common school education] night be found compelling.
However, it is our obligation to refer to the requirement of the existing constitution
which we find to be broader in its mandate of free education.
Id. at 235, 380 N.E.2d at 1142. In this respect, the case represents a significant departure from
the restrictive interpretation of the article utilized by previous courts. justice McGillicudy
specifically relied onl the framers' intention to expand the scope of the educational entitlement
to include programs for the handicapped. Id. at 236, 380 N.E.2d at 1142. The court went
[Vol. 28:769
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the present constitution, read within the constitutional history, establishes
an educational entitlement incorporating programs of instruction other than
the standard course of study. 44 Furthermore, it noted that the School Code
itself indicates that private school educational facilities providing instruction
to handicapped students are but contractual extensions of existing public
school systems. As such, the state cannot require its citizens to pay for this
established program without violating its constitutional duty.45
The holding of the appellate court in Elliot indicated that both the educa-
tion article of the 1970 Constitution and the School Code require that hand-
icapped students be included within the scope of the state educational sys-
tem. It seems, therefore, that under the present constitutional and statutory
educational entitlement, these students not only have the right to a public
education but the educational programs provided them must be free.
Federal Assistance for Special Education
Concurrent with the litigation raised in the Elliot case was the develop-
ment of federal legislation designed to assure all handicapped children a
"free appropriate public education." 46  To meet this purpose, EAHCA es-
tablished a federal aid to education program which provided reimbursement
to the state for up to 5 per cent of the excess costs for special education in
the 1977-78 school year. This assistance will gradually increase until the
1981-82 school year when a maximum of 40 per cent of excess costs will be
provided. 47
beyond the established precedents under the 1870 Constitution by reaching the decision that
the new constitutional mandate of free education in public schools requires state and local dis-
tricts to assume the total costs of private facilities furnished to its handicapped students as an
extension of their established educational system.
44. Id. at 237, 380 N.E.2d at 1142. Thus, the court indicated that handicapped students
have a constitutional right to a state-supported education. The ruling also implied that the
educational system should include in its curriculum a course of instruction geared to handi-
capped students. Only by meeting these requirements would the state satisfy the constitutional
provision that all persons are to be educated to the limits of their capacities.
45. Id. at 236, 380 N.E.2d at 1143.
46. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
The purpose of this Act as specifically stated by Congress was:
to assure that all handicapped children have available to them, within the time
periods specified ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that
the right of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected, to
assist States and localities to provide for the education of all handicapped children,
and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped chil-
dren.
20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976). For a more detailed analysis of the substantive and procedural educa-
tional rights granted to handicapped children by the Act, see Krass, The Right to Public Educa-
tion for Handicapped Children: A Priner for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016,
1063-77 [hereinafter cited as Krass]; Levinson, The Right to a Minimally Adequate Education
for Learning Disabled Children, 12 VAL. L. REV. 253, 276-81 (1978).
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1) (1978).
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To meet the threshold eligibility standards for receipt of these federal
funds, 48 a state must demonstrate to the United States Commissioner of
Education that it has adopted a policy "that assures all handicapped children
the right to a free appropriate public education." 49 The Act requires that the
state educational agency design and implement a plan 50 which includes a
method for locating and identifying handicapped children 51 and assures that
certain procedural safeguards be observed. 52  Most significantly, the state
must demonstrate that it will provide each child with a free appropriate
education suited to his or her individual needs 53 before it can qualify for the
federal funds appropriated under the Act.54
P.A. 80-1405: STATE SUBSIDY OF SPECIAL
EDUCATION AT PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS
In direct response to the accessibility of these federal funds,55 the Illinois
General Assembly introduced an amendment to the School Code 56 to for-
mally bring the state into compliance with the funding provisions of
EAHCA. 57  The amendment was passed by the General Assembly, was ap-
48. The Act is not mandatory on the states. It merely provides an impetus to the develop-
ment of comprehensive and adequate educational systems for the handicapped by supplement-
ing the funds of those states who wish to comply.
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976).
50. Id. § 1413(a).
51. Id. § 1412(2)(A)-(C) (1976).
52. Id. § 1415 (1976). The procedural provisions guarantee to students and their parents the
right to file a complaint with the state educational agency and demand an impartial due process
hearing regarding any matter relating to the provision of an appropriate education. Id. §
1415(b)(2) (1976). The purpose of these procedural safeguards is to provide the child with the
education he or she is seeking while the administration formally determines whether such a
placement is warranted. Id. § 1415(e)(3) (1976).
53. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(18), 1412(1) (1976).
54. The maximum funding a state can receive is determined by the actual number of its
children receiving special education multiplied by a factor based on the national per pupil ex-
penditures for public education. 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976).
55. Interview with State Senator Berman, the sponsor of the bill in the General Assembly,
Dec. 8, 1978.
56. S.B. 395 amended ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-7.02 (1977). The amendment also
satisfied the constitutional issues raised in Elliot, since the challenged limit on tuition reim-
bursement was removed by the new statute.
57. The amendment provides that "any educational or related services provided ... shall be
at no cost to the parent or guardian of the child." This provision satisfies the EAHCA require-
ment that the state provide free education to its children. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976). Since
Sept. 1, 1978, funding pursuant to EAHCA is allocated only to states which provide full pay-
ment costs of all handicapped students between the ages of 5 and 18 enrolled by the public
school system. This includes students placed outside the public schools under programs such as
those comtemplated by P.A. 80-1405, 20 U.S.C. § 1413(4)(B) (1976), as well as providing all
incidental services, id. § 1401(17) (1976). The requirements for the incidental services were
also provided by an amendment passed by the legislature at the same time as P.A. 80-1405. See
Pub. Act No. 80-1404, 1978 II. Legis. Serv. 983 (West).
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proved by the Governor and became P.A. 80-1405, effective August 25,
1978.58 Basically, the new Act provides 59 that the education of handicap-
ped students at approved private facilities 60 will be at no cost to the stu-
dent.6 ' This Act also recognizes the general policy of the state that "non-
public schools or special educational facilities provide an important service in
the educational system of Illinois." 6 2
Thus, this statute not only gives handicapped students the right to a free
education but it also recognizes that the scope of state-supported education
extends beyond that established by the local school districts. Unlike previous
special educational entitlements, P.A. 80-1405 clearly establishes that private
institutions contracted by the state to serve as a supplement to its educa-
tional programs are considered a part of the public school system .63 The
statute also satisfies the constitutional claim of the handicapped to a free
public education as expressed in Elliot. 64 Additionally, it is the most defini-
tive statement of legislative recognition of the right of all students to an
appropriate state-supported education.
While Illinois has affirmed its good faith commitment to the federal act by
passage of P.A. 80-1405,65 the General Assembly has expressed concern as
to its practical enactment particularly in light of financial considerations. The
cost of educating a handicapped child is approximately twice that of a normal
child, 66 and until the federal government extends its full proposed subsidy,
the state and local school districts must absorb the cost of the increased
required services.67 In addition, the federal statute prohibits the use of
58. Act of Aug. 25, 1978, Pub. Act No. 80-1405, 1978 Il. Legis. Serv. 984 (West).
59. Id.
60. The non-public facility must be "registered with the Office of the Superintendent of
Public Instruction and meet the standards established by that office." SPEC. ED. RULE, supra
note 27, at Rule 8.05, § 2d. The standards applied for approval of private facilities are embodied
in RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR APPROVAL OF NONPUBLIC FACILITIES EDUCATING HANDI-
CAPPED STUDENTS UNDER SECTION 14-7.02 OF "THE SCHOOL CODE" OF ILLINOIS.
61. Act of Aug. 25, 1978, Pub. Act No. 80-1405, 1978 I11. Legis. Serv. 984 (West).
62. Id.
63. This conclusion is supported by the special education regulations which generally pro-
vide that such a program does not relieve the district of its responsibility for the education of a
child enrolled in the alternative program. SPEC. ED. RULE, supra note 27, at Rule 8.02. More
particularly, the regulations require that the child, although he attends a private school, must
be enrolled in the public system, id. at Rule 8.05, § 2a, and the private school must be regis-
tered with the state, and its operations must conform to state educational standards. Id. at Rule
8.05, § 2e. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
64. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
65. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 1977: Hearings Before the Senate
Subcommittee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 535-36 (1977) (Statement of James D.
Nowlan, Special Assistant to the Governor for Education, State of Illinois).
66. Id. at 545.
67. According to the Committee's available estimates, the costs of educating handicapped
students as per the federal regulations is $2425 for each child. The federal share for 1979 of this
cost is roughly 5 per cent, or $70, and the balance is to be assumed by the state and local
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federal dollars for programs already instituted in the state.68  As a result,
Illinois will not be able to use its appropriated federal funds for existing
programs such as private school tuition costs or programs for non-public
school children. 69 Thus, funds allocated to educating handicapped in pri-
vate institutions could foreseeably be cut back, 70 and parents may again be
required to assume a part of the education costs of their child under this
scheme. 71
Other weaknesses are inherent in the new statutory scheme. For example,
the School Code does not require the districts to establish programs for
every type of handicapped child, rather, it only allows "for one or more"
that may be needed. 72  Thus, the district is required to establish a school
for the blind if a significant number of blind children requiring special serv-
ices reside in the district, but it need not establish a program for a blind and
mentally retarded child if the need for such a program is not shown. There-
fore, a child with a peculiar or unique handicap seems to be beyond the
scope of the statute, yet still a person in terms of the constitutional goal to
educate all persons to the limits of their capacities. 73  Also, the age limita-
school districts. The state assumes, on the average, 48 per cent of total educational costs, there-
fore, the local district must pay the balance of 47 per cent. 1d. at 546.
68. 20 U.S.C. § 241c(a)(3)(A) (1976).
69. Such a limitation on the use of the federal funds serves only to attenuate the burden of
expense on the local school district in the situations where the student attends a private facility
as an alternative to the available public programs. For example, under the reimbursement
scheme of P.A. 80-1405, for actual tuition payment up to $4500-excluding room, board, and
transportation-the school district is reimbursed from the state for the amount of payments in
excess of the district per capita tuition charge for students not receiving special educational
services. For amounts in excess of $4500, the district is responsible for such excess equal to the
district per capita tuition and is eligible for reimbursement from the state for any excess over
the sum of this per capita tuition plus $4500. Because the cost at most private facilities exceeds
$4500, the district in effect must pay twice the educational expense for a student enrolled in
this alternative program than the expense incurred in educating a child in the district's public
facilities.
70. See note 6 supra. The General Assembly has already provided for such limited appro-
priations. Act of Aug. 25, 1978, Pub. Act No. 80-1405, 1978 II1. Legis. Serv. 948 (West), pro-
vides: [11f the money appropriated by the General Assembly for such purpose for any year is
insufficient, it shall be apportioned on the basis of claims approved."
71. It is apparent that these very considerations have already become operative. It seems
that the Purchase Care Review Board instituted under P.A. 80-1405 has been ineffective in
providing funds under the new law. In fact, parents of handicapped children enrolled in private
schools under the authorized state program have been receiving tuition bills from the schools
for services rendered after the law's effective date because the school district has not been able
to meet the expenses. Interview with Sen. Berman, Dec. 8, 1978.
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-4.01 (1977). See note 27 supra. Although there is no
provision in P.A. 80-1405 stating that the district is only required to provide programs for one
or more of the handicapped as may be needed, it is incorporated by reference since the new
Act provides an alternative to the school district to meet the statutory requirement that it
establish and maintain special educational facilities.
73. ILL. CONST. OF 1970 art. X, § 1. See note 9 supra.
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tions put on the accessibility of these alternative services 74 seem to be in
contravention of the framers' intent in formulating this goal. 75  This limita-
tion is more serious than it appears at first blush considering that many
children requiring special education are not able to achieve basic minimal
skills within the age limitations set by the Act because of the nature or
seriousness of their handicap. For example, a severely multiple-handicapped
child may not achieve his or her full learning capacity by the age limit of
twenty-one. Indeed, he or she may not even learn fundamental skills until a
later age particularly if his or her formal educational training was delayed
due to the unavailability of an appropriate program.
Another criticism of P.A. 80-1405 is that it does not change the procedure
by which a student gains access to special educational programs even though
these services now will be provided at no cost to those enrolled. The statu-
tory 76 and regulatory77 scheme through which a student must apply for assis-
tance in special education at private institutions is hampered by a myriad of
administrative procedures. 78 Moreover, the courts appear unwilling to
supersede the established administrative practices so as to provide an al-
ternative remedy. 7 9
These weaknesses in P.A. 80-1405, as well as the practical possibility of
reinstitution of a tuition ceiling, require that the constitutional claim of "edu-
cation for all persons to the limits of their capacities" finally be resolved by
the Illinois courts. The interpretation of the state constitutional education
article and the School Code as given in Elliot should be affirmed by the
Illinois Supreme Court.8 0 This would impose a duty on the legislature to
74. The School Code defines the various categories of handicapped children eligible for
special educational services as those children between the ages of 3 and 21 having particularly
described characteristics. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-1.02-1.07 (1977). See note 29 supra.
75. See 6 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS 765 (Dec.
8, 1969-Sept. 3, 1970): "The committee recognizes that this provision ... mandates free school-
ing for all children through the secondary level; even for adults who have not completed high
school."
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.01 (1977).
77. SPEC. ED. RULES, supra note 27, at Rules 8.01-03.
78. Generally, the Special Education Rules provide that the local school district has the
primary responsibility for initiating the appropriateness of the request of a student for place-
ment in a special education program. If the district fails to act or reject a student's request, the
student would be forced to apply for an administrative review and an ultimate determination by
the State Superintendent of Education. See SPEC. ED. RULES, supra note 27, at Rule 8.04.
79. Pierce v. Board of Educ., 69 Ill. 2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977). In this case the Illinois
Supreme Court dismissed a suit brought by a learning disability student who sought damages
resulting from the district's refusal to place him in a special education program. The court
refused to find a cause of action and denied review of the case because the student had not
exhausted the administrative remedies provided by the Special Education Rules. Id. at 94, 370
N.E.2d at 537.
80. Because of the passage and effectuation of P.A. 80-1405, the constitutional issue of the
right to a free education for the handicapped as raised in the Elliot decision is moot and its
holding is limited to the facts of that case. However, because of the particular importance of the
issue presented, the Illinois Supreme Court should affirm the decision on appeal and broadly
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provide a free appropriate education to handicapped students and assure
these rights to all children even in the face of repeal of P.A. 80-1405 and
limitations of public funds for education.
EQUAL PROTECTION AS A MEANS OF ENFORCING
EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HANDICAPPED
As an alternative to entitlement claims under the state constitutional arti-
cle or School Code, handicapped students can assert the equal protection
clause as a means of enforcing their right to an appropriate education.8 1
The United States Supreme Court's refusal to recognize education as a fun-
damental right in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez8 2
seems to be the primary barrier to establishing the right to education for the
handicapped. Rodriguez, however, is not a complete obstacle. That decision
merely held that no fundamental right was at stake where the plaintiffs were
already afforded the opportunity to acquire basic minimal skills. 83  In situa-
tions in which a state statutory scheme effectively eliminates a handicapped
student from any of its educational programs, the Rodriguez rationale there-
fore can be distinguished. 84 Such is the case where a School Code provision
places a limit on tuition allowances to private schools operated as part of the
adopt this rationale. Such action would bind the legislature to this decision and would prevent it
from repealing the new act or modifying in any way the School Code so as to impair the
constitutional educational rights of the handicapped that were recognized by the appellate court.
81. The plaintiffs in Elliot raised the equal protection argument in challenging the tuition
ceiling fo, private facilities. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
For a more thorough discussion of the equal protection issue raised under the fourteenth
amendment, see Burgdorf, supra note 7, at 876-83; Krass, supra note 46, at 1033-42; McClung,
"'Do Handicapped Children Have a Legal Right to a Minimally Adequate Education?", 3 J.L.
EDUC. 153, 154-61 (1974) [hereinafter cited as McClung]; Comment, The Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses: Two Means of Implementing "Integrationism" for Handicapped Applicants
for Public Employment, 27 DEPAUL L. REv. 1169 (1978) [hereinafter cited as "Integrationism"
Comment]. These commentators are of the general opinion that the equal protection clause is a
viable means of enforcing educational rights for the handicapped. At the very least, most would
apply the equal protection analysis to assure the handicapped students equal access to a state-
supported education. They also advance the argument that legislation relating to special educa-
tion should be subject to a more strict judicial scrutiny. This is based on their analysis of recent
case law which suggests that handicapped students are considered an inherently suspect classifi-
cation.
82. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
83. Id. at 37.
84. For example, in Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975), the court held
that statutes pertaining to the education of mentally retarded children must be subject to an
intermediate scrutiny to satisfy the due process clause. One commentator has distinguished
Fialkowski from Rodriguez by interpreting Fialkowski as standing for the proposition that equal
educational opportunity means equal access to minimal educational services while Rodriguez
holds that equal educational opportunity is not measured in terms of equal financial expendi-
tures. See Schoenfeld, A Survey of the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 32 Sw.
L.J. 605, 614 (1978).
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public system. Setting a limit on tuition reimbursement effectively requires
the family to pay to educate their handicapped child to the same extent
other children are educated through regular public instruction. If the family
is unable to pay the unreimbursable amount of the tuition, the child may
never receive any educational services and consequently be deprived of an
education the same as if the district had denied outright a public educa-
tion.8 5
The equal protection clause is also available as a defense to other inequit-
able state educational programs for the handicapped. For example, in Mills
v. Board of Education 86 the court carries the equal protection analysis
beyond the cases which merely prohibit limited tuition reimbursement
schemes. It held that insufficient funding by the state is not a legitimate reason
for limiting required special education programs 8 7 and that the equal
protection clause requires that the available funds be expended equitably.
Thus, not only must no child be excluded from the state educational sys-
tem, 88 but lack of funds cannot bear more heavily on the handicapped child
than on the normal one.8 9 One commentator has interpreted this holding to
mean that the equal protection clause requires states to not only provide the
right to education for the handicapped child, but also the right to an
adequate education that would include substantive and not mere custodial
services. 90
Another consideration for asserting equal protection arguments by hand-
icapped students in the face of the Rodriguez decision is that they are argu-
ably a suspect class. Physical and mental handicaps seem to be the sort of
"immutable characteristics determined solely by the accident of birth" to
which the inherently suspect classification would apply.91 Under the minor-
85. Krass, supra note 46, at 1058. This issue was presented to a New York court in In re
Downey, 72 Misc. 2d 772, 340 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Fam. Ct. 1973), in which a tuition reimbursement
scheme was held unconstitutional. The court found the plaintiff was denied equal protection of
the laws when he was forced to pay the difference between the tuition costs at an approved
private facility and the costs assumed by the state as required by its constitution to provide a
free education to all children, A federal court in Virginia reached a similiar conclusion in Kruse
v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1977).
The Elliot court did not reach the equal protection argument but decided the validity of the
Illinois tuition reimbursement scheme on other grounds. See note 42 and accompanying text
supra.
86. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
87. Id. at 876.
88. This rationale was followed in Halderman v. Pittenger, 391 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
89. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
90. McClung, supra note 81, at 158-61.
91. In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1974). But cf Doe v. Laconia Super-
visor)' Union No. 30, 396 F. Supp. 1291, 1296 (D.N.H. 1975) (holding that "emotionally hand-
icapped" children are not a suspect class); New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller,
357 F. Supp. 752, 763 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that handicapped children are not a suspect
class and education is not a fundamental right).
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ity rule,9 2 when handicaps are not given equal access to such an important
interest as education, the courts may utilize a more careful scrutiny in
examining the validity of state special educational programs. 93
CONCLUSION
Discriminatory treatment of handicapped persons has gained considerable
political attention in recent years and both the legislature and courts are
taking appropriate actions in remedying this situation.9 4 In the area of edu-
cational rights, the passage in Illinois of P.A. 80-1405, providing state sub-
sidy to special education at private institutions, is an example of this recent
trend. The inherent weaknesses of this statutory scheme, however, require
that a more definitive educational guarantee to handicaps be established.
The Illinois appellate decision in Elliot v. Board of Education exemplifies
the role the judiciary should play in enforcing and expanding a statutory
entitlement given the handicapped. The Illinois Supreme Court should af-
firm the Elliot decision and ensure to handicapped students the right to an
appropriate special education under the constitutional education article.
There is a similar trend in resorting to equal protection analysis as a
means of achieving educational rights for the handicapped. Courts appear to
apply a more careful scrutiny to legislative schemes which invidiously dis-
criminate against handicapped students. 95 When faced with an equal pro-
tection attack against restrictive special education laws, the Illinois courts
should follow the case law in other jurisdictions to reach the result that
unavailability of funds does not justify the denial of education to the hand-
icapped. Such an approach would be particularly useful in advancing educa-
tional rights for the handicapped in the event the Illinois Supreme Court
refuses to reach this result through its interpretation of the education article.
Nancy J. Wolfe
The court in In re G.H. adopted the Supreme Court plurality's approach to classifying a
suspect class set forth in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The Frontiero test of
suspectness has since impliedly been rejected by a majority of the Court. See "Integrationism"
Comment, supra note 81, at 1180-81.
92. The weight of authority holds otherwise. See "Integrationism" Comment, supra note 81,
at 1179.
93. This approach was indicated by the court in Fialkowski. See note 84 supra. At least one
New York court has adopted this approach. A Family Court found a tuition reimbursement
scheme for handicaps at private educational facilities unconstitutional as a violation of equal
protection. In re Downey, 72 Misc. 2d 772, 340 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Fain. Ct. 1973). However, in a
later decision, the New York Court of Appeals refused to find either handicapped children to be
a suspect class or education a fundamental right. In re Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556,
382 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1976).
94. See generally Symposium Issue on the Employment Rights of the Handicapped, 27 DE-
PAUL L. REV. 943-1218 (1978).
95. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.). Pa. 1975).
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